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ColdWar Conflicts Conflicts Europe European Union Foreign policy NATO Propaganda & Disinformation Uncategorized US foreign policy War

I wonder how and how intensely…

I wonder how and how intensely US and UK and supporters in brain death EU are going to undermine the re-election of French President Macron. As punishment for his support for Merkel and their inclusive solution to the conflict with Russia and his peace efforts after her departure.🤔

I can’t imagine that the grudging president Biden…still sensitive to what he quickly sees as bullying against himself…has forgiven Macron this and his ‘choosing his chickens’ recently has earned enough new credit. AUKUS already not a good sign. Also fellow nationalist PM Johnson is downright resentful…

The ‘yellow jacket’ protests…which were at the time not always spontaneous in my opinion…may get a more grim sequel…



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Conflicts Conflicts Europe European Union Foreign policy NATO Propaganda & Disinformation US foreign policy War

Seeing the attacking arrows on the map…

Seeing the attacking arrows on the map of dictator Lukashenko, I am starting to get some clarity on the Russian intended “end picture” should a solution through negotiations… also with the EU regarding an inclusive European solution and vision… was and is still Putin’s vision and the answer he was/is asking for!!… fail to materialise…

Because the US, UK, NATO and their supporters here have been categorically against an undivided Europe since the late 1990s and thus against Putin’s Russia-EU vision (except Merkel at the time… and possibly Macron… as was Sarkozy earlier) this will be also an acceptable end picture for them. After quickly admitting western remnant of Ukraine to NATO (that still its name?)… and build a new iron curtain… they can continue to stir unrest in Russia influenced part Ukraine (still its name too?), in Belarus and in Russia. What a sad, so preventable reality that will become..and for the EU taking the wrong turn

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Ukraine

So probable objective new border old and new Ukraine’s (or other names?) when negotiations.. which are for Russia about much more than Ukraine itself.. so also with EU and US (&UK&NATO) will come to nothing in the coming weeks.

What a sad new reality…



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ColdWar Conflicts Europe Defence vision EU European Union Foreign policy NATO Propaganda & Disinformation Security policy EUrope US foreign policy

And then there was the Russian attack against the Ukraine after all..

(In het Nederlands)
Unfortunately, much needed in these times… Disclamer EN


So painful!! So sad when I see the pictures of the fighting, dead and wounded and distraught civilians!! My heart breaks..

But this could have been avoided!! Because if the EU neglects to offer an inclusive European solution… because that is not what the US, UK and NATO want…at all costs…who also torpedoed all of Macron’s attempts…and too many too loyal EU leaders accept and support that, then it is their own fault, and besides also the end of our EUropean dream!! Those who do not want to listen have to…unfortunately…but feel…

The Russian attack I also hoped would not happen. I am an optimist and I strive for peace!! I really could not imagine that our EU leaders would play it up so much that it would come to this. That is why I always said it would not happen. The price for Russia was too high. But apparently that moment had already arrived. But I did take it into account and also warned a number of times, very cynically, that if people wanted war so badly, they would get it..

And no, of course the Americans did not know that it would actually happen and when exactly!! If they had known exactly, they would have revealed that they had a spy at the highest Russian level. Because such a decision is taken at the very highest level. By Putin and a small team. And that would mean that the Americans themselves would unmask the existence of such an important spy. And that is not what they are doing. They were adamant about an attack on 16 February but that turned out to be false.

But suggesting this attack and giving dates for it was part of their deliberate anti-Russian propaganda and disinformation campaign (and, as I have often said, anti-EU!). After all, they did not want to offer an inclusive European security solution and vision, which is precisely what Russia was asking for. So the conflict had to be stoked up so that it did not come to that because people here thought that everything was caused by that evil Putin…

Only the French President Macron, unfortunately now without the very experienced and highly influential German (former) Chancellor Merkel next to him…. the conflict was not accidentally stoked around and after the departure of for America’s “block on the leg” Merkel by the US, UK, NATO and their supporters here in the EU. still tried to move in that direction. The newly appointed Chancellor Scholz followed him for a while, but was still too inexperienced and inadequately prepared, and with his new ambitious government, especially the fierce new Foreign Minister Baerbock, too susceptible to heavy American pressure.

Macron’s it seems inclusive European proposal was thus deliberately undermined and peremptorily rejected by the US, UK, NATO and their supporters within the EU and so Putin too had insufficient faith in it. Even though it was what he was asking for. Macron had understood the latter well. Macron then cut his losses in view of the upcoming presidential elections in France. To antagonise the Americans could prove to be very disadvantageous. The US is still very powerful within the EU.

The cynical thing is that by offering that, Russia would not be appeased, but rather put in front of the bloc itself. Do you want Putin’s vision or not? If so, develop and implement a vision, towards an inclusive and undivided Europe. If not, and not for relevant reasons, we know that your intentions are probably not positive. That is also why I am completely convinced that the US, UK, NATO and their supporters in the EU absolutely did not want this. Also without Putin. Not even if Russia had been a democracy.

And so, unfortunately, Russia decided to attack Ukraine after all. My first impression is that Russia is carrying out the same punishment and dismantling expedition as we saw in 2008 with the then totally irresponsible military attack, also triggered by the anti-Russian support and incitement of the US administration GW Bush at the time, of Georgian President Saakashvili on the Russian-backed separatists in the occupied territories in Georgia.

A kind of scenario that Russia also feared in the conflict with Ukraine in recent weeks. A Ukrainian President Zelensky with great political and especially economic problems, corona pandemic and tensions in Ukraine itself. Including a power struggle with competitors for the next round of presidential elections, especially former president Poroshenko. So circumstances for military adventurism as a distraction. So Russia significantly reinforced its forces on the Ukrainian border and in Crimea. Also in Belarus.

The Ukrainian attack did (for that reason?) not materialise but the presence of so many troops… not enough for a full-fledged invasion and occupation most experts explained by the way… also offered other scenarios and options for Putin and team. The outspoken rejection of an inclusive European solution and vision by the US, UK, NATO and supporters in the EU made Russia intervene to probably obtain a stronger negotiating position in the next round of negotiations that will surely come. Then Putin and his team are hard and unforgiving.

President Macron is and remains active in this. Peace and a solution are still possible, but now there is an alternative if an inclusive European peace proposal is rejected again by the countries involved. And the US, UK and NATO and their supporters in the EU will certainly do so again. Then the starting point is now more in Russia’s security advantage. That sacrifice is apparently worth it to Putin and regime. I wrote before that they were really done with it!

But then the future of Europe will not look good, divided again, a new iron curtain…back to before 1989…tragic for someone like me who was so happy that the cold war seemed to be over then…and made my personal sacrifices for it. And then what is left of the EU awaits a very difficult time…. It could have been so different…it is still possible!!.. I am holding on to a little hope! But it does not look good!!! So the US, UK, NATO and their supporters in EU will go very far for their Pax Americana. And most of the EU leaders too loyal, gullible and lacking vision to counterbalance this. Tragic after everything we have experienced in Europe and recently elsewhere and should have learned from it…



Unfortunately, much needed in these times… Disclamer EN



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Defence vision EU European Union NATO Security policy EUrope World

Strategic Vision EUropean Defence Union – EDU structure and armed forces 2045


download last update: 07-08-2022 23:30
– Changes air and naval forces.
– In 2045, NATO will no longer exist. Even though it now thinks to be alive again because of the conflict in Ukraine after the French president Macron recently called NATO brain death…now the EU seems to become brain death after taking a wrong turn. But this is an apparent phase…just like the earlier claimed NATO successes of its missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq and Libya and Syria…and so now Ukraine. The organisation took the wrong turn by collaborating with US and UK and their sympathisers in their egocentric nationalistic project against Russia…and the EU(!!). And will, unlike the EU, not be able to come back and recover from that.
– More info in topic land forces.
– Switzerland became member of the EU/EDU.
– Russia will also become a member of the EU/EDU before 2045. Still unthinkable today. But historically important, strategically important, and above all it offers a common European future for the younger Russian generations.
– Changes in numbers of naval forces.
– Exit 2043, now snapshot 2045, 100 years after end of WO2. More symbolic for Europe as a whole.

– MCMV’s naval forces split into larger ocean and smaller coastal/inland waterways variant.


A snapshot in the year 2045..



Index



In General EDU 2045


EDU Doctrine and Article 42.7. Primarily the EDU is defensively oriented. However the EDU is also capable of carrying out attacks in order to disrupt opponent’s aggressive intentions. This either as a deterrent or as a way to complicate the warfare of an opponent.

Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union is mutual defence clause of the EDU.

Naamloos


A political and military command structure within the EDU is created. With military HQ’s where needed and wished. Build on decades of collective experience and good practice within NATO and other alliances. Integrating some of todays NATO HQs and structures that will be no part of the reformed NATO anymore. With new global (geopolitical) realities described in this blog being integrated.


The headquarter/office of the EDU is in Strasbourg France.

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There is no question of an EUropean army. The EDU more looks like NATO old style. EU Member States contribute sovereignly military personnel and material to common EDU structures and units. Nor is there any question of far-reaching task specialisation. EU Member States retain their own complete armed forces. However, there is an aim to achieve as much EDU standardisation and interoperability as possible and different EUropean countries have entered into mutual further-reaching cooperation and integrations of their armed forces.


EDU stationing and training. The EDU has a command-structure and divided Europe in regional areas of responsibility and military structures. EDU countries work together in bigger collective formations, EDU divisions and EDU Corps. Some countries get permanent (rotating) support for their land defence from countries within EDU. Main area of concern is the southern EU border. EDU task groups patrol and protect the EU territory. Focus also on common security concerns in other parts of the world where the strategic interests of the EU need to be protected. EDU operations and troops stationing possible where needed and wished by the EDU member states.

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Troops from EDU member states are permanently stationed or, more often, rotating within continuing local collective EDU exercises in:
– Finland and Baltic States (Land, air, sea). Peace in Ukraine War and new improving relation with Russia culminating in envisaged EU membership of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, makes these less and less important. Often collective exercises from EDUBGs of EDU member states.
– Southeastern borders of Russia (land, air, sea) – Focus on threat from China;
– Southern Spain (land, air, sea) – Focus on threats from (failed) states in northern Africa and piracy;
– Italy – Sicily (land, air, sea) – Focus on threats from (failed) states in northern Africa and piracy;
– Greece – Crete (land, air, sea) – Focus on threats from (failed) states in northern Africa and piracy;
– Malta (land, air, sea) – Focus on threats from (failed) states in northern Africa and piracy;
– Cyprus (land, air, sea) – Focus on threats from (failed) states in Middle East, northern Africa and piracy.
– Territories of EU member states outside Europe (land, air, sea) – Focus on local threats.


EDU defence budget : 2% GDP. No more, no less!

Why is 2% GDP defense budget needed?!

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100003_01-satellite-world-mapShort European Security Analysis 2045


Link to blog-article – Short European Security Analysis 2045

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eu-vat-action-surveyStrategic Vision European Union – EU 2045


Link to blog-article – Strategic Vision European Union – EU 2045

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Strategic Vision European Defence Union –  EDU


link to blog-article – Strategic Vision EUropean Defence Union – EDU

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asmpa-3-900x500EDU Nuclear Forces 2045


Within this vision the EU/EDU will not directly invest in the development and production of the nuclear weapons, that stays with France, England and Russia. But the EU/EDU will contribute in their operational costs and in the needed infrastructure. The nuclear forces of England (air, sea), Russia (air, sea) and France (air, sea) are available and deliver the nuclear umbrella and deterrence. Germany, Italy, Spain, Romania and Poland (with introduction NFG/FCAS, Germany can first buy Rafale M’s for nuclear task or wait for introduction FCAS) can also launch French/English nuclear missiles from their special prepared fighter aircraft. Other EU/EDU countries can offer bases where the planes can be stationed in time of crisis. Final veto-decision

All American nuclear weapons left the EU/EDU. Within the NATO structure the nuclear forces of the U.S. are also part of the nuclear deterrence for the EU/EDU states within NATO.

Successor-class_submarine_program

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DJIBOUTI-EU-PIRACY-SECURITYEDU Naval Forces 2045


VISION EDU 2045 NAVAL FORCES
(example EDU Naval Forces 2045)
I use a number of general assumptions.. see> General assumptions Strategic Visions EDU Forces 2045


There is close cooperation with allies within a common EDU Naval Forces Staff. This umbrella staff is housed in Strasbourg France. This leads to a close form of cooperation in the field of operations, education, training, logistics and maintenance. However, all countries remain sovereign with regard to the political decision to deploy their naval forces and resources. The Commander EDU Naval Forces is the head of this staff.

EDU Naval Task Groups patrol in the seas around the EU and on defensive/show of flag missions to protect/guarding sea/shipping lanes elsewhere in the world who are of strategic interest for the EU. From Atlantic to around Africa and also in Asia. A number of commands have been established for this purpose. Such as the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Pacific and Mediterranean Commands. Also missions under NATO or UN flag or a coalition of the willing, being sometimes the beter formula for the EU countries to operate under.

I did as example elaborate on the armed forces of one future member state, The Netherlands 2045 (in Dutch), based on some of my general assumptions.

NAVAL TASK FORCES EDU (example!)

  • 6 Carrier Task Groups (2 operational at any time) of : 1 aircraft carrier, 2 destroyer/frigate air defence, 3 frigates ASW, 2 submarine SSK, 2 AOR vessels.
  • 6 Amphibious Task Groups (2 operational at any time) of : 1 LHA, 2 LHDs, 2 destroyer/frigate air defence, 3 frigates ASW, 2 submarines SSK, 2 AOR vessels.
  • 24 Patrol Task Groups (8 operational at any time) of : 1 destroyer/frigate air defence, 3 frigates ASW, 2 submarines SSK, 1 AOR vessel.
  • 12 Ocean Mine Countermeasures Task Groups (4 operational at any time) of : 4 Ocean MCM vessels.

Mostly in different and smaller formations, part in maintenance and other part working-up.

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un-a400m-un-rafale-et-un-eurofighter-allemand-lors-des-repetitions-a-parisEDU Air Forces 2045


VISION EDU 2045 AIR FORCES
(example – I use a number of general assumptions see> General assumptions Strategic Visions EDU Forces 2045)


There is close cooperation with allies within a common EDU Air Forces Staff. This umbrella staff is housed in Strasbourg France. This leads to a close form of cooperation in the field of operations, education, training, logistics and maintenance. However, all countries remain sovereign with regard to the political decision to deploy their air forces and resources. The Commander EDU Air Forces is the head of this staff.

Many countries work together in bigger collective formations. Some countries get permanent (rotating) support for their air defence from countries within EDU. EDU Air Task Groups patrol and protect the EU airspace and intercept unidentified planes and objects.

I did as example elaborate on the armed forces of one future member state, The Netherlands 2045 (in Dutch), based on some of my general assumptions.

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EDU Land Forces 2045


Since it is more difficult to make estimates for the land forces of the EU Member States in 2045, I have omitted to do so here. An earlier attempt did give many insights. The Member States will adapt their land forces to the new situation and threat picture. I did as example elaborate on the armed forces of one future member state, The Netherlands 2045 (in Dutch), based on some of my general assumptions. Russia will have a substantial smaller army, in terms of personnel and material, based on the EDU and NATO 2% GDP defence budget standard. This will be compensated for by EDU structures and EDU and NATO stationing as far as the threats at her border are concerned. This also applies to Greece. Which now still spends more than 2% of GDP on its defence.

There is close cooperation with allies within a common EDU Land Forces Staff. This umbrella staff is housed in Strasbourg France. This leads to a close form of cooperation in the field of operations, education, training, logistics and maintenance. However, all countries remain sovereign with regard to the political decision to deploy their land forces and resources. The Commander EDU Land Forces is the head of this staff.

Many countries work together in bigger collective formations. EDU Land Task groups are stationed and patrol and protect the EU territory. Supplemented and reinforced in times of crisis by non-EU NATO units, personnel and material.

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cyberwarrior

EDU Cyber and Electronic Forces 2045


Cyber and electronic warfare is a serious task area for the armed forces and therefore housed in its own operational EDU command.

Primarily, this command is defensively oriented. All weapon systems, but also control and ICT systems and networks that are linked to it, are protected by this command.

However, this command also becomes capable of carrying out electronic and cyber attacks in order to disrupt or flatten an opponent’s systems and the like. This either as a deterrent or as a way to complicate the warfare of an opponent. Several thousand specialists are permanently employed within this command. Main location/HQ will be in Strasbourg France.

I did as example elaborate on the armed forces of one future member state, The Netherlands 2045 (in Dutch), based on some of my general assumptions.

cyber-war-1024x843

There is close cooperation with allies within a common EDU Cyber and Electronic Forces Staff. This leads to a close form of cooperation in the field of operations, education, training, logistics and maintenance. However, all countries remain sovereign with regard to the political decision to deploy their electronic and cyber units and resources. The Commander EDU Cyber and Electronic Forces is the head of this staff.

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satellite-1030779_960_720

EDU Space  Forces 2045


Space is in 2045 a serious task area for the armed forces and therefore housed in its own operational command for space operations and space warfare.

Primarily, this command is defensively oriented. All weapon systems, but also control systems and networks that are linked to it, are protected by this command.

However, this command also becomes capable of carrying out attacks in space in order to disrupt opponent’s systems. This either as a deterrent or as a way to complicate the warfare of an opponent. Several hundred specialists are permanently employed within this command. Main location/HQ will be in Strasbourg France.

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There is close cooperation with allies within a common EDU Space Forces Staff. This leads to a close form of cooperation in the field of operations, education, training, logistics and maintenance. However, all countries remain sovereign with regard to the political decision to deploy their space units and resources. The Commander EDU Space Forces is the head of this staff.

I did as example elaborate on the armed forces of one future member state, The Netherlands 2045 (in Dutch), based on some of my general assumptions.

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unnamed

EDU Gendarmerie Force 2045


The field of para military gendarmerie is a serious task area for the armed forces and therefore housed in its own operational EDU command for Gendarmerie operations.

There is close cooperation with allies within a common EDU Gendarmerie Forces Staff. This umbrella staff is housed in Strasbourg France. This leads to a close form of cooperation in the field of operations, education, training, logistics and maintenance. However, all countries remain sovereign with regard to the political decision to deploy their gendarmerie units and resources. The Commander EDU Gendarmerie Forces is the head of this staff.

I did as example elaborate on the armed forces of one future member state, The Netherlands 2045 (in Dutch), based on some of my general assumptions.

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